Husband, Father, IT Pro, service.

If I ask a lot of questions, I might understand why.

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Joined 7 months ago
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Cake day: December 12th, 2023

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  • Sorry for confusion. I use Sophos utm as a WAF for exchange. Basically reverse proxy that is specifically programmed for exchange attacks. It allows OWA to keep working.

    I put the exchange admin URL behind authentication, so you try to go to /ecp, it Sophos intercepts and make you authenticate to Sophos utm first, which is passing to ad with radius.

    MS got rid of intune on prem. It’s only Azure service now. I think.

    My router is my biggest vuln. Oddly the most important. It’s an enterprise ISR. It’s updated as far as possible. My paranoia ends with the US gov/NSA. I don’t care if they want back door oddly. I don’t want China using me for attack relay however.

    Loads of monitoring. You do a span/mirror port to your IDS like security Onion. Let it analyze all your traffic. Apparently there are some state sponsored exploits that allow them to owe a router at kernel level and hide their activities from you and monitoring, but that’s a level I can’t deal with.

    As far as lock out, you create a break glass on everything. Emergency account with non rememberable ridiculous password, saved in a safe place.


    1. Exchange on prem 😳
    2. Both mdm,.Ms intune, and just installing the root cert manually in trusted store. You don’t have to root Android for that. It presents some warnings, appropriate.
    3. My Sophos is self contained. It does radius against active directory. It wants IPS and other updates though.

    I guess the firmware is as good as possible. All network devices are just computers and can be exploited. I use a Cisco router as my actual gateway. Sophos is inline after that.

    Privacy. 🤔

    Not much. I have certain traffic go through a VPN to the Internet, but that’s split tunneled.

    I use incognito? That doesn’t really do anything, ha.

    I’m slowly killing web browser tracking and cookie stuff that group policy allows.






  • I’m an enterprise guy, so that’s the explanation for non home use things.

    • VPN for anything not my web or certificate revocation distribution point
    • Sophos IPS
    • sophos utm for web application firewall
    • transparent inline web proxy, sophos is doing https inspection. I have internal CA and all clients trust it. I don’t inspect medical or banking, other common sense stuff.
    • heavily vlan segmented with firewall between
    • my windows clients are managed by active directory with heavy handed GPOs.
    • least priv accounts, different accounts for workstation admin, server, domain, network devices
    • security Onion IDS
    • separate red forest that has admin accounts for my management access and accounts on devices
    • trellix antivirus and global reputation based file monitoring
    • I’ve started applying disa STIGs on servers
    • site to site VPN with other family member household. They get managed trellix av also.
    • my public identity accounts like MS,.Google, etc all need 2fa, token, etc.

    I bet this can still get exploited, just would take effort hopefully none does for a home network.

    I’m still one shitty windows zero day click away from getting my workstation or browser tokens owned though, I can feel it.


  • One of the keys to selecting the solution from the provided answers is if you need this to be publicly trusted.

    I use an internal openssl ca root, created intermediate ca for each active directory domain or Forest. Also, I wanted to create internal PKI smart cards with yubikeys and his c1150 cards. For you know, fun.

    I didn’t care that other hosts don’t trust my stuff because all my hosts are configured with root ca, and I only use VPN for access.

    You want external trust, must do some of the other suggestions. Setting up internal CA is a chore with understanding AIA, CDP points, line of sight to PKI urls for renovation checking, more…










  • You’re correct about vlan.

    Think of vlan is a regular switch. Connect stuff, they communicate. Make two vlans in a switch, think of turning your physical switch into two separate switches.

    Connect you switches to a router. Don’t want to waste two cables from your switch that’s cut in half? Do trunk port, with vlan tagged.

    Lots of videos will explain better.

    Best practice is to separate things of different trust levels into different vlans. You can filter and control the traffic between those vlans with your router.

    As previously mentioned, in the Enterprise and business world, best practice is to separate and management from VMS and applications. We call this data plane and control plane. You would restrict access to your proxmox for other hypervisor interface from the VMS and applications. For small home setups and funsies, this gets a little complicated, but if it’s your career choice or interest, it’s a good thing to explore.

    Key terms you can research: data plane, control plane, out of band management, air gapped.